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ABSTRACT 
This research evaluates and describes the optimal communications 
solution that will enable the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s (MCWL) concept of 
Enhanced Company Operations (ECO).  Formerly known as Distributed 
Operations (DO), ECO is a concept that is intended to maximize tactical flexibility 
through decentralized operations of Marine infantry units in a distributed 
environment.  The ECO environment can be characterized by large geographic 
areas and unconventional operations that have the potential to pose unique 
challenges for tactical information system networks. 
Proposed current and emerging solutions are designed with proprietary 
protocols and interfaces as opposed to the development of modularity that 
enables common standards internetworking.  An information systems model, 
defined by sense, decide, and act nodes, decoupled from the communications 
network, and the Buddenberg Interoperability Reference Model (BIRM), is 
employed to evaluate the suitability of current and emerging USMC 
communications systems for ECO.  This thesis posits that the optimal 
communications solution is one that is designed to ensure interoperability across 
the internetwork and endpoint devices.  The authors conclude that the optimal 
solution is a tactical mesh network that converges both IP-voice and data at the 
Layer-3 (ISO Model), and extends the Global Information Grid’s (GIG) 
Convergence Layer to the individual Marine. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
No single activity in war is more important than command and 
control.  Command and control by itself will not drive home a single 
attack against an enemy force.  It will not destroy a single enemy 
target.  It will not affect a single emergency resupply.  Yet none of 
these essential warfighting activities, or any others, would be 
possible without effective command and control.1 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Hybrid Challenges and Irregular Warfare 
The Marine Corps has been engaged with diverse and adaptive 
adversaries across a range of threats since its inception.  The Marine Corps now 
faces a radically different enemy, diametrically opposed in its methodology to the 
adversaries of the twentieth century.  Many of the emerging adversaries, 
predominantly non-state actors, will pursue different objectives and tactics, 
unbound by geographical regions and political ideologies.  The unifying thread 
tying many future adversaries together is that irregular warfare will characterize 
these new enemies as they attempt to challenge overwhelming conventional 
combat superiority.  Marines are witnessing hybrid challenges, i.e., the blurring of 
conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism, and criminality.2  Since 2001, 
the Marine Corps has conducted major combat operations, conducted 
counterinsurgency operations, and engaged in stability and support operations 
across the spectrum of conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  The adversaries 
faced in the hybrid challenges of the twenty-first century have transformed the 
battlefield.  The nature of war in the twenty-first century remains unchanged: “a 
 
1 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control, (Washington, DC: United 
States Marine Corps, 1996) 35. 
2 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command.  Concept Paper: Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century.  March 20, 2009. 
http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/download.aspx?Path=./Uploads/Files/CDI_Evolving%20the%20MA
GTF%2020%20Mar%2009.pdf.  (Accessed May 2009). 
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violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by 
the use of military force.”3  The significant change faced in today’s hybrid 
challenges lies in the adversaries’ motivation; ideologies; and their ability to 
operate in small, dispersed cellular organizations, lacking clear points of 
demarcation with the flexibility to blend seamlessly with local populations or 
swarm on an objective.  They often leverage technology to increase their span of 
control and effectiveness in today’s flattened world.  Regardless of whether the 
adversary is a large, conventional state actor or an insurgency with transnational 
actors, the Marine Corps must have the flexibility to quickly organize and operate 
with speed and precision, and gain a tactical advantage over the adversary.   
2. Conventional Doctrine 
The Marine Corps has conventionally focused combat development on 
combined arms maneuver of mechanized forces, primarily at the battalion level 
and above.  Conventional combat doctrine, however, is ineffective in the hybrid 
battlespace and against enemies engaging in fourth and fifth generation 
warfare.4,5   
As learned by the French in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars, the 
British in the Boer War, the Turks in North Africa and Arabia during 
World War I, the Germans in Europe during World War II, the 
Japanese in the Philippines during World War II, and the U.S. in 
Vietnam, well organized and highly motivated irregular forces that 
can refuse combat under unfavorable conditions are exceptionally 
difficult to defeat with forces that are optimized for traditional 
combat.6 
 
3 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: United States 
Marine Corps, June 1997) 3. 
4 The term fourth generation warfare (4GW) was coined by authors William S. Lind, Keith 
Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson; and has been adopted by 
many military scholars during the last two decades.  4GW is characterized by a blurring of lines 
between combat forces returning warfare to a decentralized form.  4GW, although broad in 
various definition, centers on a non-state enemy. 
5 The term fifth generation warfare (5GW) has been discussed by some authors as a product 
of new technologies, such as nanotechnology; however, a clear definition of 5GW has not been 
widely accepted or yet recognized. 
6  David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command…Control…in the 
Information Age,” CCRP Publication Series.  April 2005. 130. 
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Concepts such as maneuver warfare and expeditionary maneuver from 
the sea, however, cannot be abandoned in favor of concentration solely into 
irregular warfare to counter the asymmetric threats of insurgencies, terrorist 
organizations and other non-state actors.  As emerging generations of warfare 
evolve, the earlier generations of warfare, with conventional adversaries, will 
continue to exist.  The twenty-first century developments, although, can no longer 
consider unlimited war, or “overwhelming physical destruction” of an enemy, as 
the exclusive driver of military capabilities.7  Following the conclusion of major 
combat operations in Iraq, as well as military operations in Afghanistan, the 
Marine Corps has predominantly conducted small-unit missions, i.e., operations 
at the company level and below, to contend with the hybrid challenges in these 
theaters.  The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that, “it is incumbent on 
the Marine Corps combat development process to identify requirements that will 
lead to training, manning, and equipping Marines for the conduct of expeditionary 
operations across the spectrum.”8  It is in the enhancement and development of 
small-unit operations, down to the individual Marine, that the Marine Corps must 
focus more effort in capability development, technology infusion and enhanced 
command and control (C2) to allow small units to effectively operate in this new 
battlespace.   
3. Distributed Operations 
The Marine Corps has conducted concept exploration and developed 
warfighting experiments to address asymmetric threats and emerging challenges 
at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) and other components of 
the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).  Early 
experimentation in the 1990s led to concept focus of small-unit operations at the 
squad and platoon level that would lead to the concept exploration of Distributed 
 
7 “Marine Operating Concept for a Changing Security Environment (MOC), 3d Edition.”  
(Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, January 2009) 1. 
8 “A Concept for Enhanced Company Operations,” (Washington, DC: United States Marine 
Corps, August 2008) 1. 
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Operations (DO).  DO was a two-year program conducted from 2004 through 
2006, characterized by decentralization, complexity, multi-dimensionality, and 
increased capability at the small-unit level.  DO was an operating approach 
focused on the deliberate use of separation and coordinated, interdependent 
tactical actions with decentralized C2 to enhance the DO unit’s advantage over a 
fluid, asymmetric adversary in an extended and complex battlefield.  The concept 
bedrock is the capacity for coordinated action by dispersed units throughout the 
battlespace.   
Following the conclusion of DO experimentation, a “Tactical Capabilities 
for Irregular Warfare Conference” was held in June 2007 to identify irregular 
warfare required capabilities.  MCWL assessed the conference findings and 
began to shift the focus of effort from the squad and platoon-focused DO 
program to the company level.  The follow-on concept development was termed 
ECO.9 
Among contributions from the study and exploration of DO 
experimentation is that small, highly capable units can be dispersed over greater 
distances, operating much more quickly and efficiently than current doctrine 
cites.  Moreover, empowering junior leaders in small units with the authority to 
make informed decisions aligned with commander’s intent increases speed of 
command.  Further, these rapid self-synchronizing small units can cover greater 
ground, while finding and engaging even the most fluid and adaptive cellular 
adversaries.  In order to realize the beneficial aspects of a DO implementation, 
there are three areas that would require significant effort and technology 
development: communications; logistics; and education and training.10  Although 
each of these areas is a critical element to the successful implementation of DO, 
the first element, communications, is of paramount essence; essential not only to 
 
9 Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., “Enhanced Company Operations: A Logical Progression to 
Capability Development.”  Marine Corps Gazette.  Quantico, VA.  August 2008. 
10 “Distributed Operations: Communications, Logistics, Education, and Training.”  Naval 
Research Advisory Committee Report.  Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development and Acquisition). Washington, D.C. July 2006. 
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developing concepts such as DO and ECO, but central to operations at every 
level across the spectrum of conflict.  Accessible and reliable communications 
are cornerstone to the survivability and lethality of DO and ECO units. 
4. Enhanced Company Operations 
ECO experimentation, as with its predecessor DO, consists of a series of 
Limited Objective Experiments (LOE).  LOEs focus on the operational utility of a 
technology or the operational utility of an experimental tactic, technique or 
procedure.11  LOEs 1 and 2 are the company-level intelligence cell (CLIC) and 
the company-level operations center, respectively.  Additionally, ECO will consist 
of two more LOEs: LOE 3 and LOE 4.  LOE 3 will examine two major objective 
areas in the context of an irregular enemy: logistics and casualty handling; and, 
C2.  ECO will conclude with a final LOE scheduled for 2010 that focuses on the 
employment of a reinforced rifle company operating from the sea.12   
MCWL is scheduled to conduct LOE 3 in the late summer of 2009.  It is 
intended to focus on company-level C2, as well as an examination of distributed 
logistics.  This thesis will focus on the concepts and technology development that 
enable C2 that will be the focus of LOE 3.   
LOE 3 takes the information exchange requirements of an ECO company 
and examines the efficacy of an experimental network backbone13 beyond the 
traditional communications medium of a radio frequency (RF) voice network.  
The experiment designers at MCWL recognize that establishing a digital network 
is the foundational bedrock for ECO-as well as all other operations under the 
 
11 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, “MCWL Analysis Reports,” 
https://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/analysisrpts.cfm.  (Accessed May 2009). 
12 Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., “Enhanced Company Operations: A Logical Progression to 
Capability Development.”  Marine Corps Gazette.  Quantico, VA.  August 2008. 
13 The term “backbone” refers to the transmission line or the part of the command and 
control system that serves as the long-haul communication link or provides a reach-back 
capability. 
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concept of network centric warfare (NCW)14 and services in the Global 
Information Grid (GIG).  To emulate a fully capable, on the move (OTM), over the 
horizon (OTH) network, MCWL developed a netted iridium distributed tactical 
communications system (DTCS).15  DTCS will provide the communications link 
between the ECO Marines and the C2 systems employed that will enhance 
battlespace awareness and link to battlefield sensors and shooters. 
ECO is a concept that purports to maximize tactical flexibility through 
decentralized operations in dispersed, distributed environment.  The dispersion 
of the company can be defined as either: over large geographical areas that don’t 
conform to conventional areas of responsibility (AOR); or, it can be defined as 
over urban and other environments where proximity of obstacles, concentration 
of noncombatants and interference create relative isolation, making conventional 
C2 more difficult, to the point of ineffectiveness.  The nature of ECO 
experimentation aims to provide an additional warfighting capability to address 
the challenges faced in the hybrid battlespace, particularly at the company level 
where a broad gap in C2 capability is extant.  Tactical commanders at the 
company level are now responsible for the geography and missions that have 
traditionally been assigned to a battalion, or higher.  In order for a company to 
effectively operate under the ECO construct, the shortcomings of the current and 
proposed tactical C2 architecture must be addressed before enhanced and 
additive capabilities can be realized.  Until then, the communications capability 
will always be a limiting factor.  
This thesis will focus on enabling ECO through critical analysis of current 
and future tactical communication requirements, and will identify the limitations of 




14 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and 
Leveraging Information Superiority, CCRP Publication Series.  February 2000. 
15 Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., “Enhanced Company Operations: A Logical Progression to 
Capability Development.”  Marine Corps Gazette.  Quantico, VA.  August 2008. 
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concepts in the commercial sector, that will provide the foundation for a proposed 
network communication solution with the unique characteristics of an ECO 
company, will be explored. 
5. COC Study CAPSET V for MAGTF C2 
In October of 2008, the MCCDC published a report titled “Combat 
Operations Center (COC) Study Capability Set (CAPSET) V for Marine Corps 
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) C2.”  This study focused on the C2 needs of 
small-unit leaders below the battalion level.  It argues that, while current doctrine 
and nodal concepts address the communication requirements and roles of staff 
support missions at the battalion and above, there is little information that 
describes the common nodes C2 requirements of small-unit leaders.16  The 
study describes the changing nature of small-unit leader requirements: 
Historically, small-unit leaders have relied primarily upon voice 
radios with minimal data capability to receive the Commander’s 
intent and execute missions. While this method of voice 
transmission has been adequate in the past, the complexity of the 
environment we now operate in has changed... ...they must have 
improved situational awareness (SA), increased bandwidth and 
improved network services. In essence, they must be smarter and 
better informed than the enemy.17 
The study was intended to derive and describe the C2 capability 
requirements for Marine units below the battalion level.  In detail, it describes the 
operations of small-unit C2 nodes and their C2 capability requirements.  It also 
identifies current and planned material solutions and gaps between those 
material solutions and capability requirements.  The CAPSET V MAGTF C2 
study illustrates communication capability requirements very similar, if not almost  
 
 
16 Command and Control Integration Division (C2ID),. Combat Operations Center (COC) 
Study Capability Set (CAPSET) V for Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command 
and Control (C2). Doctrinal Study, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 
United States Marine Corps, Woodbridge: Computer Sciences Corporation, 2008, ES-1. 
17 Ibid. 
identical, to those identified as ECO capability requirements by the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Lab in October of 2008.18  The similarities of the organizational level 
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18 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.  “Enhanced Company Operations” brief presented 
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B. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Marine Corps C2 doctrine states that the C2 system is composed of three 
basic elements: people, information, and the C2 structure.19  All three elements 
play a critical role in the shaping of ECO.  The C2 structure is, essentially, an 
information system.  The second and third elements, “information” and the “C2 
structure,” will form the basis for this thesis.  The challenge behind any form of 
distributed operations or ECO is not in the imagining of new capability, nor 
merely giving them enhanced tools that allow them to project more combat power 
with smaller units.  To suggest that Marine Corps infantry battalions need greater 
lethality capability than they currently possess would indicate a misunderstanding 
of the firepower a battalion can bring to bear on an adversary.  The challenge is 
in maintaining the capability and combat power as smaller units increase their 
dispersion beyond mutual support.  The greater the separation, the higher the 
 
19 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control, (Washington, DC: United 
States Marine Corps, October 4, 1996) 3. 
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diminishment of capability (C2, fires, logistics, human performance, etc.).20  The 
C2 structure is the framework for enabling ECO and the information is the critical 
component that drives the operations that enable ECO.  
The departure from traditional philosophies and methodologies of C2 that 
ECO requires illuminates the shifting characteristics of the battlespace and the 
information age.  Military hierarchies were organized based on their leaders’ 
effective span of control.  Empirical wisdom states that a leader can effectively 
control between three to twelve subordinates in the carrying out of a task or a 
function.  Many subjective factors contribute toward the precise number for the 
task, e.g., complexity, competency of the subordinates and their leader, and 
many other human factors.  Military hierarchies were established on these same 
principles and modified as necessary in response to the compelling need for 
clear and constant communications in the battlespace.21  The Marine Corps has 
traditionally organized in operational spans of three: three fire teams to a squad; 
three squads to a platoon; three platoons to a company, etc.  The same basic 
structures can be traced back to the Civil War when communications relied on 
voice of command, bugles, couriers, semaphore flags, and the telegraph.22  As 
factors are introduced that alter the leader’s span of control, i.e., more complexity 
and friction, the ability to command and control degrades.   
ECO represents a shift from a centralized, hierarchical organization of 
forces (company), to a decentralized element with more independent Marines.  
This paradigm shift is not new to the Marine Corps.  This concept has taken the 
form of many different names and concepts over the years, but its stark contrast 
was prominently noted in the late 1990s by then-commandant General Charles 
Krulak.  Krulak illustrated the incredible mounting instability and global disorder 
that sent Marines into action around the world. 
 
20 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Carolan, Head, Field Testing Branch, 
Experiment Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, VA.  November 2008. 
21 Martin van Creveld, Command in War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1985. 
22 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command Control in the 
Information Age,” CCRP Publication Series.  April 2005.  43. 
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In far-flung places like Kenya, Indonesia, and Albania, they have 
stood face-to-face with the perplexing and hostile challenges of the 
chaotic post Cold War world for which the "rules" have not yet been 
written.  The three block war is not simply a fanciful metaphor for 
future conflicts-it is a reality.23 
The “Three Block War” concept was a nascent insight that would forge the 
Corps’ emerging challenges amidst the future battlespace’s complexities.  It was 
an early stimulus to the senior leaders that traditional warfighting doctrine will not 
translate well in the changing nature of future global conflicts.  Krulak’s “strategic 
corporal” was the de facto model of the challenges inherently faced by the small-
unit leader.  Whether the term du jour is three block war, hybrid challenges, or 
fourth generation warfare, greater demands are being placed on decision makers 
at all levels.  
There are two basic uses for information: create SA as the basis for a 
decision; and, for directing and coordinating actions in the execution of the 
decision; both of which are rarely mutually exclusive in practice.24  The 
significance of this is an integral component to determining success for decision 
makers in the ECO construct.  The strategic corporal is indicative of the 
enhanced education and training sought for Marines operating in ECO 
companies.25  Contrasted with Napoleon’s Corporal,26 the strategic corporal will 
be required to make decisions with far reaching implications and, often times, in 




23 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.”  Marines 
Magazine, 28, No. 1. January 1999. 32. 
24 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control, (Washington, DC: United 
States Marine Corps, October 4, 1996) 49. 
25 The composition and employment of an ECO company is conceptual and has not been 
clearly defined.  In one sense, the ECO company would be a company that has additive skill sets 
that the typical Marine infantry company lacks, or it could be the construct that successive infantry 
companies are modeled. 
26 Napoleon’s corporal was a member of Napoleon’s army used to ensure that orders issued 
by Napoleon were clear and understandable by even the lowest of intellects before being 
dispatched to Napoleon’s generals. 
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strategic corporal, who could well be a lance corporal or a even a private in an 
ECO construct, will need clear commander’s intent and accurate SA from which 
to invoke his own judgment and base his decisions. 
Currently, the Marine Corps, along with other joint and coalition services, 
are deploying units into Afghanistan tasked with military and peacekeeping 
operations.  Many of these units are operating more independently and over 
greater dispersed and distributed environments.  The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines 
(2/7), based at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center in Twentynine 
Palms, California, deployed to Afghanistan from April 2008 to November 2008.  
Assigned to the Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and later to the 
Special Purpose Marine Air—Ground Task Force—Afghanistan, the 2/7 
conducted full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations from locations in Northern 
Helmand and Eastern Farah Provinces.27  The 2/7 conducted operations over 
10,000 square miles.28  Frontages like these are being carved more often for 
smaller sized units contrasting with traditional areas of responsibility. 
1. Network Centric Warfare 
The term NCW29 describes a theory for warfare, encompassing varying 
explicit definitions and interpretations, might be described simply as developing 
and leveraging information superiority.  Similar to other transformational warfare 
theories such as Revolution in Military Affairs, NCW is a concept that illustrates 
the exponentially increased value of shared awareness and collaboration on the 
battlefield through the networking of these elements.  Alberts and Hayes30 
 
27 First Marine Expeditionary Force, “History of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment.” 
http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/div/7mar/2bn/history.asp (Accessed May 2009). 
28 Dan Lamothe, “2/7 to Complete Return from Afghanistan.”  Marine Corps Times.  
December 7, 2008. 
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2008/12/marine_afghanistanreturn_120308w/ (Accessed 
May 2009). 
29 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command…Control…in the 
Information Age,” CCRP Publication Series.  April 2005.  
30 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command…Control…in the 
Information Age,” CCRP Publication Series.  April 2005. 
describe the evolution of information exchange and the mechanisms that have 
been designed to value, store, share, and access information.  They discuss the 
requirements, advantages, and disadvantages of various information exchange 
technologies.  They begin with the telephone information exchange as seen in 
Figure 3. 
 13
Figure 3 Capabilities of Telephone Information Exchange (From Alberts, 
2005) 
Information could be effortlessly, but not efficiently, exchanged; however, 
it relied on various requirements of understanding the value of the information, 
who needed the information and how to contact them synchronously to exchange 
the information (voicemail is not an element of their discussion).  Although an 
inefficient system of exchanging information, it was sufficient for short, point-to-
point exchanges when the sender, or transmitter, knew how and when to contact 
the listener, or receiver. 
Broadcast capabilities were used in the Department of Defense (DoD) in 
the 1970s to push, or broadcast, information using either a point-to-point or 
multicast capability.31   
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Figure 4
                                           
 Capabilities of Broadcast Information Exchange (From Alberts, 
2005) 
The enhanced advantage of broadcast information enables the sender to 
reach a broad set of listeners simultaneously, introducing video and eliminating 
the need to know a receiver’s “identity.”  Alberts and Hayes point out that the 
critical fault in broadcast capability lies in its temporal constraint, i.e., information 
exchanged required all interested listeners to be present during the transmission.  
Information was not preserved for later listeners.  The information could be re-
broadcasted, but doing so would decrease communication efficiency and was still 




31 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command Control in the 
Information Age,” CCRP Publication Series.  April 2005. 78. 
Combining telephone and broadcast capabilities, they argued, further increased 
information dissemination capabilities but remained inadequate for warfighting 
communication requirements.   
Alberts and Hayes postulated that warfighter information systems needed 
a fully networked collaborative environment.32  Figure 5 illustrates the richness 
and consummation of the idealized warfighter information system replete with the 




                                           
 Capabilities of Networked Collaborative Environment (From Alberts, 
2005) 
The fully networked collaborative environment represents the next stage in 
evolution.  It leaps beyond today’s primary tactical communication means of 
single-channel, push-to-talk radio frequency radios to a fully integrated network 
that delivers voice, data, availability, accessibility, and is asynchronous in time 
 
32 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command…Control…in the 
Information Age,” CCRP Publication Series.  April 2005. 81. 
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and space.  Alberts and Hayes point out the myriad challenges in the 
synthesizing of the information in ensuring that the information is filtered for the 
ones that need it.  Merely having access to information is not the objective.  The 
Internet readily provides more information than users of the World Wide Web can 
process.  The desired network will provide the right information to the right 
person at the right time.  The fully networked collaborative environment would, 
however, use systems to connect listeners to senders.  The challenge is that it 
may not include all of the listeners and may include some listeners that do not 
need to be listening and thus clouding their information synthesizer.  Combat 
information systems illustrate this weakness.  Many of today’s C2 and combat 
information systems include sensors that link information to target listeners, e.g., 
position location information (PLI), video, target identification, autonomous 
logistics, etc.  The inherent weakness in these systems is the availability of the 
information to those that need it; or, at a minimum, additional information 
exchange requirements to gain access to the information.  Many C2 and combat 
systems use point-to-point pathways that limit access to specific system 
equipment that can interface with the combat system.  Many of these systems 
have resulted in stove-piped, niche capabilities that are available to a select 
number of users.  The fully networked collaborative environment would be able to 
share this information across the warfighter network and be accessible to the 
warfighters that need it. 
C. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
—Potential enemies encountered in ECO are expected to be 
unconventional (continuingly modifying current and historically-successful tactics 
and techniques), and they will strive to attack dispersed Marine units using 
asymmetric methods. Small-unit leaders will be relied upon to counter this threat. 




 Current and proposed immature communication technologies exist 
that can be adopted to enhance warfighting capability in the 
transformed battlefield.  However, a requirements statement does 
not exist that will fuse these technologies in a solution that will 
enable ECO. 
 Current technologies are not designed to the requirements of highly 
mobile, dynamic, and resource constrained environments of current 
battlefields. 
 Proposed current and emerging solutions are designed with 
proprietary protocols and interfaces as opposed to development of 
modularity that enables common standards internetworking. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What is the appropriate framework for evaluating network 
communications solutions? 
 What are the Marine Corps’ current and emerging network 
communications solutions that will enable ECO? 
 What is the optimal communications solution that will enable ECO 
for concept development at MCWL? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
1. Research USMC ECO publications, articles, and related material. 
2. Conduct site visits to: 
a. MCWL, Quantico, VA 
b. MCCDC, Quantico, VA. 
c. Office of Naval Research (Code 353), Arlington, VA 
3. Interview key personnel and conduct limited survey to identify areas 
of concern regarding the C2 of an ECO unit. 
4.  Research RF to IP technologies, related reference material and 
industry experts.  Additionally, read relevant and recent Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis research related to C2 systems 
and ECO. 
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5. Research interoperability standards in defining communication 
architecture requirements. 
6. Perform laboratory and field tests to evaluate proof of concepts. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter I discusses the problem and provides background information 
into the changing battlespace and the hybrid challenges inherent to today’s 
conflicts.  It provides the foundation for why the ECO concept is so critical to 
shifting Marine Corps operations and how they are departing from current 
doctrine.  Additionally, it states the reason for conducting this research and 
provides a contextual framework for the reader. 
Chapter II discusses the importance of defining the taxonomy of the 
information systems model as applied to the evaluation of a communications 
system. 
Chapter III discusses and defines the network requirements used in the 
evaluation of a communications system. 
Chapter IV defines the endpoint device requirements used in the 
evaluation of a communications system. 
Chapter V is a brief summary of both the network and endpoint device 
requirements.  
Chapter VI describes the operational capability requirements for small 
units as identified by MCWL and the C2ID, MCCDC for ECO and CAPSET V 
users. 
Chapter VII evaluates the current and emerging DoD tactical 
communications systems. 
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Chapter VIII provides an assessment of the communications systems as 
evaluated against the information systems requirements and attempts to answer 
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II. INFORMATION SYSTEMS MODEL 
A. SEPARATE THE COMPONENTS 
In order to achieve the ideal information system, it must be broken down 
into its conceptual components.  The application and data required to conduct, 
for example, the surveillance of a target in a distributed environment are not 
relevant to the communications network.  The capability to send real time 
streaming video from a Marine back to a CLIC some distance away is really the 
functionality of an endpoint device.  In this scenario, it would be a networked 
video camera, but the video camera does not “care” what network it is using or 
how it gets the streaming video to its intended recipient.  The only required 
capability of the video camera is that it can somehow package the video so that 
the stream can be passed over a network. 
The DoD chronically makes the mistake of developing stovepipe 
information systems that fail to modularize or decouple the sense, decide, and 
act nodes and their information from the communications network.  A classic and 
very USMC-relevant example of this phenomenon is the Blue Force Tracker 
(BFT).  The BFT is a closed stovepipe system that is not networkable and thus 
cannot share information with other networks.  The BFT is the primary PLI 
system for tactical forces that provides a common operating picture at the tactical 
level.  In order to benefit from the information provided by the BFT, a unit must 
have a BFT device, which incorporates a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) and 
satellite radio that cannot be separated from the processing and display part of 
the system.  The sense functionality of the information system is not an endpoint 
device that can be decoupled from the communications network.33 
 
 
33 Capt Glen Henton, Deployed Support Team Trip Report OIF, MCTSSA, USMC, 2008. 
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In order to analyze the requirements of the information system that could 
enable and support ECO, it is necessary to single out the communications 
network and its architecture.  The endpoint devices on any tactical network must 
be decoupled from the communication network which connects them.   That is to 
say, any network device, its applications, and the data that is generated or 
received must be separate and independent of the communications network.  If 
the functional activities, or endpoint devices, are decoupled from the underlying 
communications network, then the utility of the communications network is infinite 
and only limited by the different types of endpoint devices that can be attached to 
the network. 
B. COMMUNICATIONS-SENSE, DECIDE, AND ACT 
According to Professor Rex Buddenberg, “information systems contain 
sense, decide, and act functions, connected together with communications.”34  In 
this thesis, the “communications” will be synonymous with a communications 
network.  A communications network can be a small tactical single-channel radio 
network or a global enterprise network comprised of numerous types of 
architectures, such as the GIG.35  Buddenberg uses the analogy of a person as 
an information system.  The eyes are the sensors; the brain provides the 
functionality of “deciding,” and then sends signals to the arms and legs to “act.”  
The body’s nervous system, or the communications network, ties all of these 
functions together. 
Buddenberg points out that the sense, decide, and act functionality is 
provided by endpoint systems on a communications network.  This analogy can 
be applied to any tactical weapons platform such as a tank or an individual 
Marine.  For example, a Marine might have a thermal scope (sensor) on his rifle 
providing imagery to his brain that evaluates a target (decides) and then 
 
34 Rex Buddenburg, Information Systems Interoperability. 2009. 
35 John G. Grimes, Department of Defense Global Information Grid Architectural Vision. DoD 
CIO Vision Report, Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks & Information Integration-Chief 
Information Officer, Department of Defense, Washington: DoD CIO, 2007. 
prosecutes the target with his rifle (acts).  The analogy can be further expanded 
to illustrate the potential capability of an infantry company conducting ECO.  A 
man-packed aerial reconnaissance drone might be the sensor that is providing 
imagery a block away from a squad of Marines that decides to act on or engage 
a target by requesting indirect fire support from the company’s mortar section.  
Conceptually, there can be multiple sense endpoint devices which can pass 














                                           
Sense, Decide, Act Nodes 
C. INTEROPERABILITY 
1. Buddenberg’s Interoperability Reference Model (BIRM) 
Buddenberg’s Interoperability Reference Model36 organizes the 
interoperability of information systems into seven layers: 
(7) Doctrinal 
(6) Cognitive/Shared SA 
(5) Procedures 
(4) Processes 




36 Rex Buddenberg, "Toward an Interoperability Reference Model." Critical Issues in C4I. 
Fairfax, VA: AFCEA-GMU, 2008. 1-4. 
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Layers 3-7 are beyond the scope of this thesis.  Layer-1 (Inter-
networkability) is pertinent to defining the characteristics of the communication 
network that connects the sense, decide, and act functions of an information 
system.  Layer-2 (Modularity) prescribes the architectural blueprints from which 
the endpoint devices must be designed in order to provide separate and 
independent sense, decide, and act functions.37 
Buddenberg explains that modularity is achieved in two steps:  
1) Decoupling of end systems from the communication network, 
which enables the reuse or interchanging of the end systems 
without changing the communications network. 
2) Designing modularity between end systems.  Step 2 allows 
for the “use of a Sense module from one information system 
to feed data to a Decision module in another information 
system.38 
Inter-networking is the ability of an information system to be concatenated 
together using routers.  That is, in order for a communication networks to be 
interoperable, they must be Layer-3-capable.  Tactical networks, of which 
individual nodes are not Layer-3-capable, require a gateway device to 
internetwork with the GIG.  For example, the packaged and deployable USMC 
Combat Operations Center made by General Dynamics,39 requires a rack-
mounted unit to convert single-channel radio networks into IP-voice for battalion 




37 Rex Buddenberg, "Toward an Interoperability Reference Model." Critical Issues in C4I. 
Fairfax, VA: AFCEA-GMU, 2008. 1-4. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Combat Operations Center, General Dynamics C4 Systems. 
http://www.gdc4s.com/content/detail.cfm?item=58543087-c533-457b-833c-deb873b09c5a. 
(Accessed May 2009). 
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2. Architecture 
Buddenberg’s architecture concepts are based on two principles:   
1. All end systems in/on a platform are connected to the node’s Local 
Area Network (LAN) 
2. Wide Area Networks (WANs) must be routable networks.40 
We are applying Principle #2 to tactical wireless networks.  Buddenberg 
explains that for Principle #1, the inverse is true: “end systems do not have radio 
interfaces-those are all on the other side of a router.”41 
Buddenberg explains that the interfaces of all end systems on the network 
should adhere to the “Good Network Citizens” concept.  This concept requires 
that endpoint devices must have the following interfaces: 
1) LAN Interface-Ensures the ability to network the device’s 
information. 
2) Packaging Interface-Ensures that data will be organized into fields 
such as MIME or XML.  Also lays the foundation for security. 
3) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Interface-Enables data security. 
4) Quality of Service (QoS) Interface-Enables differential service at 
Layer-3, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and video 
requirements. 
5.) Management Interface-Enables remote operation and management 
of endpoint devices to truly realize NCW. 
D. TWO PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF THE INFORMATION SYSTEM 
The information system can be evaluated from the perspective of two 
primary elements: 1) the endpoint devices and 2) the communications network.  
The requirements for endpoint devices can be evaluated through Principle #1 of 
 
40 Rex Buddenberg, Information Systems Interoperability. 2009. 
41 Ibid. 
Buddenberg’s architecture principles, while the requirements for the 
communications network can be evaluated through Principle #2.  The 
overarching requirement for both of these elements is that they are designed to 
achieve interoperability.  The endpoint devices must be interoperable with each 
other and interoperable with the communications network.  Consequently, the 
communications network must be interoperable with the endpoint devices it will 
host, but it must also be interoperable with other networks.  More specifically, any 
tactical communications network must be capable of connecting with another 
tactical network to form an internetwork.  The following two chapters will examine 
the necessary characteristics and requirements of these two primary elements 
and how they can be defined to ensure a viable, scalable, and robust information 
system capable of enabling ECO. 
 
 
Figure 8 Two Primary Elements of Architecture 
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III. NETWORK REQUIREMENTS 
A. LAYER 3 REQUIREMENTS 
1. Interoperability 
To discuss interoperability as it pertains to network requirements, it is 
important to revisit the first Layer (Inter-networking) in the BIRM described in 
Chapter II.  Buddenberg defines inter-networking as the ability of an information 
system to be concatenated together using routers.42  That is, in order for a 
communication networks to be interoperable, they must be Layer-3-capable.  In 
the case of small units working in distributed environments, we want to ensure 
that any node in the network is interoperable.  Principle #2 of Buddenberg’s 
Interoperability Architecture states that WANs must be routable networks.  We 
are applying Principle #2 to all nodes on the tactical mesh network.  The reason 
for this is clear.  In a dynamic network topology, there will be no fixed gateways 
or nodes that we know will always be on the boundary of a WAN concatenating 
the network with other networks to form an internetwork.  Therefore, in order for 
the nodes of a tactical mesh network to be interoperable, they must be Layer-3 
(International Standards Organization Model) capable. 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. 
2. Extending the GIG (Convergence Layer) 
According to the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) GIG Architectural 
Vision43, “an IP-based network infrastructure is the foundation of end-to-end 
                                            
42 Rex Buddenberg,"Toward an Interoperability Reference Model." Critical Issues in C4I. 
Fairfax, VA: AFCEA-GMU, 2008. 1-4. 
43 John G. Grimes, Department of Defense Global Information Grid Architectural Vision. DoD 
CIO Vision Report, Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks & Information Integration-Chief 
Information Officer, Department of Defense, Washington: DoD CIO, 2007. 
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interoperability in the target GIG.”  The document describes the IP-based 
network as the “Convergence Layer.”  The document also explains that 
“underlying this internetworking layer are all types of DoD-relevant physical 
transport media and technologies.”  In other words, the IP-based Convergence 
Layer is the place in the GIG that different types of network architectures are 
linked together.  For example, copper cabling networks, fiber-optic networks, 
Satellite Communications (SATCOM), and tactical wireless networks are 
internetworked at the IP-based Convergence Layer. 
Millions of dollars have been spent by the DoD in solving the problem of 
internetworking disparate communications networks.44  Solutions to this 
convergence problem are many and pervasive throughout DoD network 
initiatives.  They range from designing JTRS devices that combine more than 16 
different types of waveforms45 into a limited IP-based capability to gateway 
devices that converge copper cabling telephone systems with IP-based DoD 
backbones. 
As is stated in the DoD’s Architectural Vision, the GIG encompasses all 
forms of tactical networks, to include Layer-3 data networks, analog and digital 
telephone networks, and simple radio networks.  This thesis posits the solution of 
extending not just the GIG, but the IP-based Convergence Layer to the lowest 
tactical level, the individual Marine.  Applied to Buddenberg’s Information 
Systems Model, the IP-based network would be the communications network 
that connects the sense, decide, and act endpoint devices of the tactical 
information system.  This concept differs from existing and emerging tactical 
network technologies such as the Marine Corps’ Warfighter Information Network-
Expeditionary (WIN-X) program46 and JTRS in that it does not create another 
 
44 Paul Schmidle and Nathan Brinker, "Standards Based Collaboration." Command and 
Control Research and Technology Symposium. San Diego: Command & Control Research 
Program, 2004. 12. 
45 JTRS, JPEO, "Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Joint Executive Program Office 
(JPEO)." Fact Sheet. San Diego: JTRS JPEO, April 4, 2008. 
46 C4, USMC, Warfighter Information Network-Expeditionary WIN-X. Headquarters Marine 
Corps Brief, Quantico: USMC C4, 2008. 
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disparate network that must be converged at the Layer-3 via specialized 
gateways.  It simply extends the Layer-3 to the individual Marine.  That is, it 
extends the IP-based Convergence Layer. 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Extend the Convergence Layer (Layer-3) to each node (individual 
Marine). 
3. Voice and Data Convergence 
As outlined above, a Marine infantryman in a distributed environment 
requires unique communications capabilities in order to conduct those tasks and 
missions indicative of ECO.  To achieve these goals, he requires the capability to 
communicate via voice and data.  Conventional communication platforms adhere 
to separate voice and data architectures.  That is, a Marine is required to carry 
both a single-channel radio for voice, and a separate device for data capability.  
This load includes all ancillary items such as antennas, batteries, and cabling.47 
Emerging tactical network technologies consolidate both digital voice and 
IP-based data networks into a single device, yet there are additional 
disadvantages to this approach.  Emerging tactical network solutions such as the 
Harris® AN/PRC-117G48 and the Trellisware® CHEETAHNET® radios use 
separate data and voice channels, essentially employing a single device to 
maintain two different types of communication networks.49  Both Harris® and 
Trellisware® employ a time-division multiple access (TDMA) protocol to solve the 
media sharing problem.  Sharing two different channels, or different types of 
communication network architectures, significantly reduces the throughput of 
                                            
47 Clayton A. Craig and Christopher S. Tsirlis, "Command & Control for Distributed 
Operations: An Analysis of Possible Technologies, Structure & Employment." Thesis. Naval 
Postgraduate School, June 2007. 
48 Harris Corporation, “AN/PRC-117G(V)1(C)” http://www.rfcomm.harris.com/117G/ 
(Accessed May 2009). 
49 Harris Corporation, "Advanced Networking Wideband Waveform (ANW2): Overview for the 
AN/PRC-117G." Harris, Ocobert 2008. 
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both.  Additionally, utilizing TDMA to share channels within the same node 
reduces data rate and creates overhead which effectively reduces the available 
data rate, which is minimal to begin with. 
In Section A of this chapter (Extending the GIG), it was illustrated that 
Layer-3 is the foundational Convergence Layer for the GIG; so eventually, the 
digital voice channel will have to be converged at the IP-layer, when 
communicating to the battalion-level or above.  A practical solution is to simply 
use a single network architecture, such as an all IP-based network.  By 
employing a common layer network, all transmission media can be dedicated to 
passing data from a single layer.  Additionally, employing a single architecture, 
allows for a reduction in the combat load and operating complexity for the 
individual Marine. 
The use of an IP-based architecture would require that all voice capability 
be moved to VoIP.  The use of VoIP for tactical voice traffic would require QoS 
standards.  The commercial employment of VoIP has realized vast improvements 
of QoS standards and the advancement of IP-telephony.  Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP) is a signaling protocol that is widely used for ensuring QoS in 
voice and streaming video applications.50  Secure VoIP is regularly used by 
deployed forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF).  In fact, Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) 
VoIP systems employing SIP, and managed by Cisco’s® CallManager and 
CallManger Express, are the Marine Corps’ preferred means of secure voice 
communication at the battalion-level and above.51  Merging tactical company-
level and below VoIP networks with existing secure architectures would be a 
relatively simple integration. 
 
50 Rosenberg, et al., SIP: Session Initiation Protocol. Request For Comments: 3261, Internet 
Engineering Task Force, The Internet Society, 2002. 
51 Based on Capt Price’s experience managing tactical Marine communication networks in 
OIF 05-07. 
 33
Other tactical advantages in the use of an all Layer-3-capable platform 
include the reduction in the requirement of IP processing.  All end-to-end 
services are delivered over an IP architecture relying on IP-based protocols for 
end-to-end transport, QoS, session management, security, and mobility. 
Reliance on an all-IP network facilitates easy convergence with other networks, 
and exploits the rich ecosystem for application development that exists for Layer-
3.52 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Converge all information to Layer-3 (eliminate separate voice). 
4. Availability 
a. Principles of Availability Engineering 
Buddenberg explains that there are three principles of high 
availability engineering: 1) Elimination of single points of failure, 2) Reliable 
crossover, and 3) Prompt detection of failures as they occur.53  Principles 1 and 
2 pertain to the Network Requirements, while Principle 3 is germane to the next 
chapter, “Endpoint Device Requirements.”  The elimination of single points of 
failure may primarily be a provisioning issue; however, it is also an issue of 
network design.  A data network that can handle many-to-many connections, and 
is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing these connections, has the 
ability to eliminate single points of failure.  This is a given in any established and 
wired network, but becomes more unique and important in a tactical wireless 
network that is not mesh-capable.  Buddenberg states that the connectionless 
design of IP meets the requirements of Principle #2: Reliable Crossover. 
                                            
52 Full Spectrum, “The WiMAX-e Advantage.” 
http://www.fullspectrumnet.com/fullmaxoverview/thewimaxeadvantage.html (Accessed May 
2009). 
53 Rex Buddenberg, Information Systems Interoperability. 2009. 
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One of the most challenging aspects of wireless mesh networking, 
is the prospect of controlling and mitigating network congestion.  Availability in a 
tactical mesh network plays a significant role in the attribute of scalability when a 
network’s nodal capacity grows in size to accommodate 42 nodes in a Marine 
rifle platoon.  Indeed, the Marine Corps’ primary tactical network device, the 
AN/PRC-117G can only connect 10 nodes in a subnet.54  Principle #3 (prompt 
detection of failures), and advanced Layer-2 and Layer-3 routing protocols 
continue to evolve to meet these challenges. 
b. Streaming Video 
Certain ECO operations require streaming video applications from 
endpoint devices.  This operational requirement generates relatively heavy data 
rate requirements for meshed network topologies.  Streaming video with a frame 
rate of 15 frames per second (fps) is generally accepted at the tactical level as 
the minimally acceptable rate that allows for actionable area-effects targeting and 
surveillance, although this does not allow for precision targeting nor does it allow 
for targeting in areas where there is a risk of collateral damage.55 
Two streaming video assessments (not experiments) were 
conducted during Tactical Network Topology (TNT) field experiments in 2007 and 
2008.  The frame rate of 15fps using Windows Media Encoder at a compression 
ratio of 320 X 240, with an initial data rate of 128 Kilobits per second (Kbps), was 
employed to stream real-time video over a distance of approximately five miles 






54 Harris Corporation, "Advanced Networking Wideband Waveform (ANW2): Overview for the 
AN/PRC-117G." Harris, October 2008. 
55 Based on Capt Price’s extensive experience in the employment and coordination of C4I 
systems during combat operations (OIF 2004, 2006). 
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which conducted meshing at Layer-2.  As the data rate was degraded from 
distance and multi-hop overhead, the video was consistently untenable as an 
operational resource.56 
A study conducted by the Institute for Telecommunications 
Science, performed subjective video quality testing to estimate the level of video 
quality that first responders57 find acceptable for tactical video applications.  It 
was determined that 384Kbps is the recommended data rate required for 
streaming video with the H.264 high compression codec.58  A tactical mesh 
network with streaming video at this rate would require broadband data rates to 
also allow for VoIP and other application traffic. 
c. VoIP 
G.729, the most commonly used codec for secure VoIP over 
wireless networks in the Marine Corps59, requires a bandwidth of 31.2 Kbps over 
a LAN.  If this is applied to three conversations within a Marine squad, it equates 
to 93.6 Kbps.60  Keep in mind that if the same scenario were applied to a 
platoon, the intra-squad communications would not be relevant, since a rifleman 
is generally not going to be talking to his fire team leader or squad leader and not 
to his platoon sergeant or platoon commander.  To add the scenario network 
consumption rates up with the simultaneous scenario in the above Streaming 
 
56 Capt Bob Price, Distributed Operations Tactical Command & Control (DOTC2) 
Experiment. Tactical Network Topology 08-2 Experiment after Action Report, Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008. 
57 The term "first responder" refers to those individuals who in the early stages of an incident 
are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the 
environment, including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101). 
58 Margaret H. Pinsonand, Robert B. Stafford, "Video Performance Requirements for Tactical 
Video Applications." IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security. Woburn: IEEE, 
2007. 85-90. 
59 Based on Capt Price’s extensive experience in the installation, operation, and 
maintenance of communication and information systems during combat operations (OIF 2004, 
2006). 
60 Cisco®, "Voice Over IP-Per Call Bandwidth Consumption." www.cisco.com. February 2, 
2006, http://ww.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk652/tk698/technologies_tech_note09186a00800 
94ae2.shtml (Accessed June 2009). 
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Video paragraph, you get a total of a (384 Kbps + 93.6 Kbps) 477.6 Kbps data 
rate requirement.  This does not include the overhead of multiple hops necessary 
in a mesh network.  The 500 Kbps estimation can be assumed as the reasonable 
cost of true NCW at the tactical level.  Wideband channels are required for each 
node to achieve these types of data rates. 
Information System (Network) Requirements: 
-  Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. 
- Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its 
connections. 
- The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-
3). 
-  The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without 
the need for dedicated router devices. 
-  Device employs wideband channels to achieve >500Kbps per 
node. 
B. LAYER 2 REQUIREMENTS 
1. Tactical Mobile Mesh 
Tactical mobile mesh networks are wireless communication networks 
characterized by: harsh propagation channels and interference, frequent and 
rapid changes in the network topology, the requirement for very robust, low 








                                           
These features distinguish such networks from mesh networks (stable 
network topology), sensor networks (low data rate, delay tolerant), and ad hoc 
networks (relatively benign RF environments).61 
a. Providing More Combat Powers 
The value of a tactical mesh network may not be as easily 
understood relative to the value of a commercial network.  Metcalfe’s Law states 
that in a communications network with n members or nodes, each can make (n-
1) connections with other participants.  Metcalfe states that the total value of that 
network is proportional to n(n-1).  The intent of Metcalfe’s law was to determine 
the value of a network as it relates to the cost of the network, and at what point 
the exponential curve of the network value would overcome the linear growth of 
network cost in a commercial telecommunications industry.62 
Current tactical networks are obviously missing the boat when it 
comes to building upon the idea of increasing combat power by increasing nodal 
connectivity.  In order to truly exploit the exponential increase in combat power 
by increasing network connections, every node must be on the same network.  
That is, the ideal network topology would provide one internetwork that provides 
connectivity across the entire battlespace.  By employing disparate networks, 
single-channel radio for an infantry squad, and an IP-based data network over 
Wireless Point-to-Point Link (WPPL)63 for intelligence units, then the “n” in the 
Law remains at small values. 
Metcalfe’s Law can be applied to tactical networks, although the 
value of a tactical network must be examined from a different perspective.  
Obviously, a tactical network’s value should not be measured by cost.  More 
 
61 Adam Blair, Thomas Brown, Keith M.Chugg, and Mark Johnson. "Tactical Mobile Mesh 
Network System Design." Military Communications Conference (MILCOM). Orlando, FL: IEEE, 
2007. 1-7. 
62 George Gilder. "Metcalfe's Law and Legacy." Forbes ASAP, September 13, 1993. 
63 WPPL is a wireless point-to-point link that provides secure line-of-sight/non-line-of-sight 
RF communications over terrestrial microwave radio links at distances extending up to 35 miles.  
WPPL was developed by TeleCommunication Systems. 
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appropriately, the value of a tactical network should be measured in its ability to 
aid in the accomplishment of a military unit’s mission.  In terms of a Marine 
squad, that mission is to, “locate, close with, and destroy the enemy, by fire and 
maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat.”  So the value of 
a tactical network would be its ability to support this mission.  In a widely 
distributed and decentralized squad layout, any one of the Marines or nodes 
could be of the highest importance, as any one of the Marines might have “eyes-
on” a potential threat or target.  Or, any one of the squad members might be in a 
position to act as a network relay link to the rest of his squad.  Additionally, the 
network status of each node would change rapidly in the course of an operation.  
So, in a dynamic combat environment, all network links or connections would 
have equal value as they relate to the mission. 
To determine the value of a squad network employing existing 
single-channel radio networks, it is necessary to step back and apply an older 
network valuation method, since the single-channel radio network is essentially a 
broadcast network and has no mesh network or routing characteristics.  In order 
to evaluate a broadcast network, an older concept can be used.  The Sarnoff 
Law was named after David Sarnoff and is ideally suited to assess the value of 
broadcast networks, as it was applied to television and radio broadcasts.64  
Sarnoff’s Law states that the value of a broadcast network is directly proportional 
to the number of viewers or listeners.  In a single-channel radio network, the 
Marine that is squeezing the push to talk button on his radio handset is the 
“broadcaster,” while the other members of his squad are the “listeners.”  In this 
context, a single-channel radio network has the same characteristics as a 
television or radio broadcast.  A single-channel radio network currently employed 
by the Marine rifle squad cannot perform switching, or routing, nor is it mesh-
capable 
 
64 David P. Reed,  "That Sneaky Exponential—Beyond Metcalfe's Law to the Power of 
Community Building." Context, Spring 1999. 
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David Reed, an Adjunct Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Media Lab, has introduced an additional concept (known as Reed’s 
Law) into the valuation of networks.  He states that, once networks are 
combined, new and different nodes within those networks coalesce around 
common interests and form their own network.  He has coined these networks 
“Group-Forming Networks” or Gin’s, which can are akin to social networks that 
we are now familiar with in the form of Facebook or MySpace™.  According to 
Reed’s Law, a network that provides easy group communication creates an 
additional type of connectivity that scales exponentially with the number of 
nodes.65  Reed’s Law can be expressed as 2n-n-1. 
More recently, Bob Briscoe, Andrew Odlyzko, and Benjamin Tilly 
have proposed what they consider a more realistic hypothesis on the value of 
networks and their interconnectivity.  They have applied a valuation method 
based on the equation n log(n), where n is the number of nodes in a network.  
The n log(n) valuation is based on Zapf’s Law, and the authors claim that it is 
more indicative of actual network company relationships in the marketplace.  
Zapf’s Law explains that network links are ranked in order of the amount of value 
provided.  This concept can be applied to the links in a tactical squad-sized mesh 
network since at any given time some links may provide more value to the 
network than others.  The n log(n) valuation is more conservative in the 
estimation of network value.66 
Signoff’s Law, Metcalfe’s Law, Reed’s Law, and the n log(n) Law 
are applied to a 13-man Marine infantry squad to illustrate the added capability a 
network provides.  To expose the difference in value or capability of a 
communications network, Signoff’s Law is used to illustrate the current use of 
single-channel radio assets, while the other laws are employed to illustrate the 
difference in network value provided by interconnected mesh networks.  In the 
 
65 David P. Reed,  "That Sneaky Exponential—Beyond Metcalfe's Law to the Power of 
Community Building." Context, Spring 1999. 
66 Briscoe, Bob, Andrew Odlyzko, and Benjamin Tilly. "Metcalfe's Law is Wrong." IEEE 
Spectrum, July 2006: 34-39. 
below graph, “capability,” that is, the capability that a network would provide an 
infantry squad in the accomplishment of its mission, is substituted for “value.” 
 
Figure 9 Value of Tactical Mesh Network 
The point here is to illustrate that no one can possibly know the 
added value of employing a network that can connect every node with every 
other node in range.  The value of connecting every Marine with every other 
Marine, in which there is an operational need, is unknown.  As described above, 
we do know that there will be value, although we do not know the extent of that 
value.  Suffice it say that Marines will find ways of using the capability of 
internetworked and interoperable information systems in ways we cannot yet 
envision.  In this sense, combat power will be ensured by creating a 
decentralized architecture that is unrestrained and characterized by infinite 
possibilities.  This is in contrast to current and emerging technologies that are 
designed to fill a specific function.  Instead of constraining operational units with 






Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within 
range. 
b. Mesh Network Allows Dynamic Range Extension 
(1) Every node is a “retrans.”  An obvious advantage of a 
mesh network is that every radio/Marine/node is a retransmission (retrans) site.  
Conventional single-channel capability requires the use of a retransmission site 
to be established in order to extend the radio network across the battlespace.  In 
this case, a dedicated team of communication Marines is required to move to a 
position that is ideally suited to establish radio connectivity between two units.  
Usually this team must position themselves on high ground to achieve the non-
line-of-sight (NLOS) required for radio reception between the two units.  This 
becomes an operational requirement and drain on unit resources, as the unit 
must devote a team of Marines to provide security for the retransmission team.  
The security requirement becomes even more pronounced when a unit is 
operating in a widely distributed environment where friendly lines are dispersed 
as enclaves around firm bases and the area in between these enclaves is hostile. 
Establishing a retransmission site requires the use of two 
single-channel radios, sometimes in the form of a vehicular mounted and 
amplified system.  This reduces the amount of radios for the squad or platoon.  In 
general, the configuration of radios for a retransmission site is at the limit of a 
communications Marine’s competency level.  The coordination of Single-Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)-based network identification 
codes adds additional complexity to mission planning and may be lost in the fog 
of war. 
A network with dynamic mesh capability eliminates the 
requirement of consciously establishing a retransmission site.  In an ad hoc mesh 
network, every node is a retransmission site.  A mesh network node is a 
 
continuous and dynamically capable retransmission site and provides de facto 
range extension, as illustrated in Figure 10, entitled Tactical Range Extension via 
Mesh Network. 
 
Figure 10 Tactical Range Extension via Mesh Network 
 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. 
(2) Remote Network Relay. The dynamic capability of a 
mesh network allows for the introduction of remotely operated or autonomous 
network relay nodes.  Several experiments have been conducted by the Naval 
Postgraduate School, which have demonstrated the capability of mesh network 




                                           
A group of Navy and USMC NPS students teamed up with 
MCWL to assess the operational feasibility of small handheld wireless mesh-
networking radios made by Trellisware®.  The intent was to determine the self-
healing/forming meshed-networking capabilities of the wireless network design, 
and to specifically assess the network merging characteristics between multiple 
distant ground nodes in a DO environment.  The Center for Interdisciplinary 
Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS) Pelican aircraft was used as an 
aerial relay platform with the intent of demonstrating the feasibility of adapting the 
Trellisware® radios to the CQ-10A Snow Goose Parafoil platform for follow-on 
FY08 MCWL experimentation in LOE-5.  Network merging experiments were 
conducted with both aerial and ground network relays during four Pelican flights 
over a two-day period. 
The team successfully demonstrated the feasibility of using 
an aerial relay platform as a means of merging geographically separate mobile 
tactical nodes.  This capability provides voice and data connectivity to mobile 
ground troops operating in terrain-limiting NLOS environments.  Although 
systems currently exist to provide this capability, the devices employed in this 
experiment integrate this capability with much smaller handheld push-to-talk 
voice systems, similar in profile to the Thales Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio 
AN/PRC-148.167, 68 
 
67 Thales Communications, Inc., “MBITR AN/PRC-148” 
http://secure.thalescomminc.com/cart2/tcAccessories.asp (Accessed March 2009). 
68 Capt Bob Price, Distributed Operations Tactical Command & Control (DOTC2) 
Experiment. Tactical Network Topology 08-2 Experiment After Action Report, Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008. 
 Figure 11 Network Ground Node Locations 
 









Mon, 25 Feb  Ground  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Handheld 2 W Successful Successful
       
Tue, 26 Feb  Ground  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Handheld 2 W Successful Marginal Success
  Aerial  Morning Vehicle‐Mount 10 W Successful Successful
  Aerial  Afternoon Vehicle‐Mount 10 W Successful Successful
       
Wed, 27 Feb  Ground  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Vehicle‐Mount 10 W Successful Successful
  Aerial  Morning Handheld 2 W Successful Unsuccessful
  Aerial  Afternoon Handheld 2 W Successful Unsuccessful
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Figure 13 Test Results 
c. Mesh Network Enables Decentralized Communication 
The configuration of conventional tactical networks at the infantry 
company and below has evolved in architecture to mirror the chain of command.  
Traditionally, the unit structure hierarchy of the fire team, squad, platoon, and 
company has been the conduit of both operational and informational flow.  For a 
small unit conducting ECO in a distributed environment, this traditional paradigm 
has changed.  As seen in both OIF and OEF, units have been so widely 
dispersed that they have been independently supported with both indirect fire 
and logistics apart from their chain of command.  They have also operated 
“laterally” with units that may be transiting their battlespace, without the 





Figure 14 Conventional Single-Channel Radio Network Hierarchy 
For example, a squad requesting fire support from battalion heavy 
mortars would need to coordinate the fire support with its platoon commander, 
who in turn would coordinate with his company commander, who in turn would 
coordinate with his battalion fire support officer or weapons platoon commander.  
Of course, the battalion operations officer would need to be in the loop. 
Examining the same situation with a squad that is conducting ECO 
in a widely distributed environment, we see that the traditional operational flow 
might depart significantly.  In this scenario, a squad is 15 kilometers away from 
its adjacent squad and platoon headquarters.  A section of 155mm howitzers is in 
general support to the infantry squad’s area of operations.  The squad leader 
requests fire support and coordinates with the gun section to achieve effects on 
target.  The operational information flows laterally and is not passed through the 





                                           
Decentralized Operational Flow Concept 
2. Stable Media Access Control (MAC) 
There are two types of MACs: stable and unstable.  An example of an 
unstable MAC is a contention-based MAC such as IEEE 802.11, which employs 
carrier-sense multiple access (CSMA).  It has been shown that the performance 
of unstable MACs degrades under overload.  In particular, in a highly loaded 
wireless network, the portion of channel bandwidth wasted due to collisions is 
significantly high.69  In other words, a tactical wireless network employing an 
unstable MAC would show an unacceptable degree of degradation upon breach 
of its nodal capacity. 
Why does this matter?  It causes the network to stall.  The network 
capacity of mobile wireless networks is four to six orders of magnitude smaller 
than wired networks.70  Wireless networks have much lower data rates than, say, 
a fiber-optic WAN.  An inefficient MAC wastes the very limited bandwidth 
capacity of wireless networks. 
 
69 Xue Yang and Nitin H. Vaidya, DSCR: A More Stable MAC Protocol for Wireless 
Networks. Technical Report, Urbana-Champaign: Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2002. 
70 Rex Buddenberg, Information Systems Interoperability. 2009. 
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Stable MACs include time-division multiple access (TDMA) and demand-
assigned multiple access (DAMA).  The primary benefit of a stable MAC is that it 
is stability under overload, but there are secondary benefits as well.  Stable 
MACs have demonstrated a much more efficient use of bandwidth, and they are 
also capable of QoS control.71  The characteristics of a stable MAC are 
demonstrated in IEEE 802.16.72 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Each node must have a stable MAC. 
3. Ability to Multicast 
At the Data Link Layer (DLL) the term multicast refers to a one-to-many 
distribution of data, or a point-to-multipoint.  This describes the ability of a 
wireless node to transmit data to all other nodes within range at the price of a 
single transit.73  This is important for the same reasons as the stable MAC 
requirement.  Wireless networks must use bandwidth as efficiently as possible. 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Each node must have the ability to multicast. 
4. Fault Detection74 
SNMP agents must be incorporated into all nodes in order to ensure that 
network devices are behaving in the most efficient manner.  The primary 
requirement is the detection of faults as they occur, which enables the 
optimization of network devices.  A secondary benefit is that SNMP agents allow 
 
 
                                            
71 Rex Buddenberg, Information Systems Interoperability. 2009. 
72 IEEE Std 802.16-2009. 
73 Rex Buddenberg, Information Systems Interoperability. 2009. 
74 Rex Buddenberg, Information Systems Interoperability. 2009. 
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for the remote and local detection of faults in the node and network segment 
traffic.  This is also important for ensuring the most efficient use of the wireless 
network’s limited bandwidth. 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. 
C. LAYER 1 REQUIREMENTS 
1. Dynamic Frequency Spectrum Capability 
The analog or baseband processor of network nodes must be software 
definable in order to allow for the variation of both channel bandwidth and 
transmission frequency.  The primary reason for this is to enable the range 
extension of individual nodes.  Conventional “high data rate” technologies, such 
as those specifications for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Wideband 
Networking Waveform (WNW) begin at the 2 GHz range.75  The Trellisware® 
CHEETAHNET® radio is capable of UHF spectrum operation.  Frequencies in 
the UHF and SHF range simply cannot achieve the NLOS propagation required 
in a tactical environment.  Only frequencies in the VHF spectrum are capable of 
NLOS.  ECO will be conducted in both variable natural terrains and dense urban 
environments that will require NLOS capability.  Additionally, the software 
definable capability allows for the variation and dynamic optimization of 
modulation schemes, which ensures QoS over variable distances between 
mobile nodes. 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Each node’s TX/RX must be software defined. 
                                            
75 JTRS, JPEO, "Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Joint Executive Program Office 
(JPEO)." Fact Sheet. San Diego: JTRS JPEO, April 2008. 
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2. Separation of ISO Layer Functionality 
Another important aspect of modifiability in the design of the network is the 
use of communications technologies.  Wireless technologies will inevitably be 
improved to provide greater data rate and more efficient use of the Physical 
(PHY) and Media Access Control (MAC) layers.  In fact, more and more cross-
layer approaches are being employed to advance the capability of wireless mesh 
technologies.76  In a wireless mesh network, it is essential to design the nodes 
such that they can be modified.  In a network sense, this implies that, while the 
PHY and MAC layers will most certainly change, the routable capability of the 
node must stay the same.  In the architectural design proposed by this thesis, the 
router part of the node can be interchanged with the transmission system.  More 
specifically, the PHY and MAC layer functionality should be separated from the 
node’s router.  This does not necessarily mean that a transmission system must 
be physically separate from a router, but the router portion of a Marine’s network 
device should definitely be interchangeable with the transmission section of the 
device.   
This approach ensures modifiability and allows for an evolutionary 
readiness and flexibility of future advances in both the routing capability and the 
transmission capability.  The Internet has been served well by this approach, and 
has allowed for significant innovation across all layers of the largest internetwork.  
This modifiability approach will also allow for the technological inadequacies of 
current transmission systems and the difficult problem of achieving both the 
ability to transmit Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) while maintaining a sufficient 
amount of data rate, though great advancements have been achieved recently.  
To elaborate, a Marine would be able to swap out a Very High Frequency 
(VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) transmission system for a Super High 
Frequency (SHF)/Extremely High Frequency (EHF) transmission system in order 
 
76 Adam Blair, Thomas Brown, Keith M. Chugg, Mark Johnson, "Tactical Mobile Mesh 
Network System Design." Military Communications Conference (MILCOM). Orlando, FL: IEEE, 
2007. 1-7. 
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to communicate through a satellite.  This enables an individual node to maintain 
the same network, while achieving a different and more flexible PHY layer 
capability. 
Information System (Network) Requirements: 
- Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its 
router. 
D. INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 
Infrastructure protection is a network requirement that crosses both Layers 
1 and 2 of the ISO model.  Infrastructure cannot be confused with “content 
protection” which is provided at the higher layers.  Infrastructure protection can 
be characterized by security measures such as theft of service, denial of service, 
traffic analysis, traffic flow analysis, low probability of detection, transmission 
security, and jam resistance.  All of these are important for a combat 
environment. 
Information Systems (Network) Requirement: 
-  Each node provides infrastructure protection. 
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IV. ENDPOINT DEVICE REQUIREMENTS 
A key aspect of Buddenberg’s Interoperability Reference Model applies to 
the endpoint devices.  Layer-2 (Modularity) prescribes the architectural blueprints 
from which the endpoint devices must be designed in order to provide separate 
and independent sense, decide, and act functions.77  Endpoint device modularity 
is achieved by decoupling them from the network.  More specifically, the endpoint 
devices must be located behind a node’s router, effectively residing on the 
node’s LAN.  This allows for the ability to interchange endpoint devices behind 
the router, leaving the network unchanged.   
The other important aspect of achieving interoperability among endpoint 
devices is to design them to be modular in relation to each other.  This is 
accomplished by designing endpoint devices to adhere to the “Good Network 
Citizens” concept as mentioned in Chapter II.  To reiterate the concept, all 
endpoint devices must have a LAN, Packaging, PKI, QoS, and management 
interface.  These interfaces ensure modularity by providing an ability to network 
the device’s information, organizing the data, provide data security, provide 
quality of service, and to manage the device itself.78   
Information System (Endpoint Device) Requirements: 
-  Endpoint Devices must have a LAN interface. 
-  Endpoint Devices must have a Packaging interface. 
-  Endpoint Devices must have a PKI interface. 
-  Endpoint Devices must have a QoS interface. 
-  Endpoint Devices must have a Management interface. 
 
                                            
77 Rex Buddenberg, Information Systems Interoperability. 2009. 
78 Ibid. 
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V. INFORMATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY 
A. NETWORK REQUIREMENTS 
1. Layer-3 Requirements 
- Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. 
- Extend the Convergence Layer (Layer-3) to each node (individual 
Marine). 
- Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). 
- Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its 
connections. 
- The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3 
IP). 
- The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without 
the need for additional dedicated router devices. 
- Device employs wideband channels to achieve >500Kbps per 
node. 
2. Layer-2 Requirements 
- Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within 
range. 
 - Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. 
 - Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. 
 - Each node must have a stable MAC. 
- Each node must have the ability to multicast. 
- Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. 
3. Layer-1 Requirements 
- Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. 




4. Infrastructure Protection Requirements 
 - Each node provides infrastructure protection. 
B. ENDPOINT DEVICE REQUIREMENTS 
1. Endpoint Devices must have a LAN interface. 
2. Endpoint Devices must have a Packaging interface. 
3. Endpoint Devices must have a PKI interface. 
4. Endpoint Devices must have a QoS interface. 





Figure 16 Individual Marine Network Device Concept
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VI. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Before attempting to identify an optimal communication solution that would 
enable ECO, the information system requirements must first reach a point of 
concurrence from the senior leadership throughout the Marine Corps on what 
additive capability the ECO company needs to bring to the MAGTF Commander 
to address full spectrum operations across all battlefield functions.  A list of ECO 
concept-based requirements was approved and presented by MCWL to the 
Marine Corps Infantry Operational Advisory Group (IOAG) in October of 2008 
after being approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.79  Selected 
approved requirements will be discussed across each warfighting function and 
illustrated with services that would be enabled by an optimal ECO 
communication solution that is not currently organic to a conventional infantry 
company table of organization and equipment.  The selected function 
requirements are not necessarily the most important requirements or highest 
priorities; however, the authors targeted most of the respective requirements 
because they were defined well enough to tether to available communication 
services in an enhanced network solution. 
These capabilities are similar to those identified in the C2ID CAPSET V 
Study.  The CAPSET V study closely mirrors the capabilities identified by MCWL, 
but it also elaborates on desired characteristics of a CAPSET V information 
system.80  It is important to note that the small unit, as identified in the CAPSET 
V study, are the same units that would conduct ECO, and, as such, the 
capabilities identified by both MCCDC’s C2ID and the MCWL will be almost 
 
79 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,  “Enhanced Company Operations” brief presented 
to the Infantry Operational Advisory Group.  October 22, 2008.  Slide 4. 
80 (C2ID), Command and Control Integration Division, Combat Operations Center (COC) 
Study Capability Set (CAPSET) V for Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command 
and Control (C2). Doctrinal Study, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 
United States Marine Corps, Woodbridge: Computer Sciences Corporation, 2008, ES-1. 
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identical.  There are slight differences in the degree and scope of the capability 
requirements, as some requirements identified by the MCWL are unique to ECO. 
A. MANEUVER  
The optimal communication solution would leverage not only more 
efficient adjustments across the spectrum of operations; it should streamline and 
minimize redundant and extraneous coordination with adjacent units across all 
operations.  A squad operating over dispersed terrain with large frontages would 
often transit across or amidst adjacent units in noncontiguous sectors.  Current 
communication limitations require pre-coordination between the units and their 
respective higher headquarters to coordinate network identification, call signs, 
frequencies, timing, encryption, PLI, etc.  Given the fluid nature of combat 
operations, the battlespace is continuously changing with adaptive adversaries.  
Current RF communications lack the flexibility to maintain SA in dynamically 
changing situations.  Safe passage of lines between units is often relegated to 
visual identification and often without advance notice.  Even within visual 
identification of friendly units, their RF networks are often unable to link and 
communicate without pre-coordination and require vertical coordination through 
their respective higher headquarters. 
In this scenario, the information system would need to sense PLI, either 
from a GPS satellite, or from a fellow unit member.  The information system 
would then transmit that data from the position location sensor, via the network, 
to another Marine.  The network does not need to know what the information is, 
only where it needs to go.  The sensor (endpoint) on another Marine would 
certainly need to recognize the information and be able to interpret and decide on 
it.  To coordinate maneuver with adjacent units, the unit would require the 
capability to not only sense and coordinate where its own Marines are, but to 
also coordinate with units that are not on its own internetwork.  This would 
require sense and decide nodes passing data over the network.  It would also 
require a network that was capable of efficient interoperability and authentication. 
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A desired information system would automatically self-synchronize and 
bridge their networks when identifiable nodes were within transmission range.  
Each node should be able to communicate with all other nodes on the network.  
Current single-channel radio systems across adjacent units or transiting units 
often can dedicate only one node, e.g., the convoy commander’s vehicle, for 
communication with adjacent units while the remainder of the mobile unit 
communicates via a separate decoupled net.  Self-forming, self-healing, mesh 
networks would significantly minimize the amount of pre-coordination necessary 
and would be more resilient to dynamic environments and unpredictable 
conditions.  The additive capabilities provided would enable units operating within 
the same area of operation to quickly and easily communicate. 
B. FIRES  
Capability Requirement: Continue to explore means to provide greater 
aviation fires support to company and below units.81 
One of the challenges at the tactical small-unit level is requesting and 
coordinating supporting arms fire.  Disparate RF communication systems in 
current operations require disparate and incompatible radio systems that require 
advance coordination with higher units.  This inflexibility in dynamic situations 
greatly diminishes a unit’s ability to effectively call for accurate fire while ensuring 
the safety of the distributed ECO unit.  The communication solution should 
accommodate disparate waveforms that are transparent to the network users.  
Shared PLI between air and ground units decreases fratricide incidents and 
increases the SA of all networked nodes that may provide additional fire support 
assets.  The enhanced SA is transmitted back to the higher headquarters to 
update the common operating picture with real-time updates. 
 
 
81 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, “Enhanced Company Operations” brief presented to 
the Infantry Operational Advisory Group.  October 22, 2008.  Slide 10. 
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In this scenario, SA comes in the form of position/location sense nodes 
that must pass information over the network between disparate units.  An aircraft 
would initially be on a completely different network than the ground unit for which 
it is providing close air support (CAS).  Regardless, the ground unit must be able 
to pass and receive sensory data over the network.  This requires a highly 
interoperable communications network; one that is communicating the same type 
of data.  A decide node might also be used in order to prevent fratricide.  A 
decide node on the aircraft would receive data from sense nodes and inform the 
pilot that he can safely prosecute a target without endangering ground forces.  
Additionally, fire control data, such as target coordinates, Identification of Friend 
or Foe (IFF), and available assets, must be shared among disparate units in 
order to effectively prosecute a target and mitigate fratricide.  A possible scenario 
might involve the sense nodes of 1st Squad identifying a target, passing that data 
to 2nd Squad which requests and directs fire support from an artillery battery.  
This conveys the need for the information systems of all acting units to be 
capable of communicating and sharing data over the same internetwork. 
C. INTELLIGENCE 
Capability Requirement:  Establish the ability to employ sensors at the 
company and platoon level using organic personnel.82 
The optimal communication network solution would provide network 
access down to the platoon level that would facilitate the collection and 
dissemination of biometric data with real-time database or decision support 
services.  A fully networked solution enables data transfer of immediate query 
and response transmissions to relay sensor data and provide decision makers at 
the lowest tactical level enhanced SA.  Current RF communications at the 
company level lack the data capability and reach over distributed distances to 
communicate with higher headquarters where the biometric databases reside. 
 
82 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,  “Enhanced Company Operations” brief presented 
to the Infantry Operational Advisory Group.  October 2008. Slide 7. 
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The current limitations result in significant time delay in the processing of 
collected sensor data.  Delays of mere minutes in the rapidly shifting battlespace 
often result in fleeting or lost opportunities. 
Applying the sense-decide-act model of information systems, we can 
easily recognize that each of these sense nodes must possess a modular data 
interface.  This data interface must package the information such that it can be 
transmitted over the entirety of the GIG.  Another user scenario might be a squad 
conducting a planned patrol over a distributed area.  In this instance, the squad 
might identify Conditions of Interest (COI) that it would need or want to know 
about as it is traversing an area.  For example, it would want to know of any 
enemy activity along its patrol route.  Perhaps an aerial sensor node identifies a 
vehicle moving to intersect the squad route.  The sensor communicates that 
information to a decision support service.  The decision support service (decide 
node) recognizes this information as a COI previously input by the squad and 
transmits a warning to the squad leader.  Or, if the vehicle is positively identified 
as an enemy target, the decide node informs a remote weapon (act node), which 
then prosecutes the target. 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Capability Requirement:  Limited Capabilities—Over the Horizon/On the 
Move Data Communications to the Platoon (Squad) Level83 
Capability Requirement:  Selected Capabilities—Over the Horizon Digital 
Communications at the Company Level84 
Both of the stated C2 concept-based requirements would be fully realized, 
and integral, to a usable ECO communication solution.  The routable solution 
would provide a long-haul reach that would bridge dispersed nodes throughout 
the AO with higher headquarters.  The data capability would be a critical 
 
83 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, “Enhanced Company Operations” brief presented to 
the Infantry Operational Advisory Group.  October 22, 2008.  Slide 5. 
84 Ibid., Slide 5. 
 64
                                           
requirement in routing VoIP.  This Over the Horizon reach back with higher 
headquarters would facilitate real-time SA within the tactical network and on the 
common operating picture.   
E. LOGISTICS 
Capability Requirement: Establish the capability of the Company to 
more effectively plan, manage, track, receive and distribute logistics.85 
Capability Requirement: Develop the means to deliver tailored logistics 
packages directly to the platoon and squad levels from battalion/MAGTF 
sources.86 
Capability Requirement: Establish the capability to employ multiple 
modes of re-supply.87 
Current limitations with single-channel radios requiring extensive 
coordination would be overcome with fully networked solutions.  The ECO 
communication solution would bridge this gap enabling numerous additive 
capabilities.  Autonomic logistics would be enabled along with other 
communication-intensive operations such as re-supply and casualty evacuation. 
F. FORCE PROTECTION 
- ECO Requirement: Develop, define and refine medical support for 
ECO.88 
- ECO Requirement: Explore new technologies for casualty 
treatment and evacuation.89 
 
85 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,  “Enhanced Company Operations” brief presented 
to the Infantry Operational Advisory Group. October 22, 2008. Slide 9. 
86 Ibid., Slide 9. 
87 Ibid., Slide 9. 
88 Ibid., Slide 10. 
89 Ibid., Slide 9. 
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As addressed in the previous warfighting functions, current limitations with 
single-channel radios require extensive coordination, lack the flexibility to easily 
scale and are not self-aware.  One of the greatest challenges faced by an ECO 
unit is the significant dispersion from supporting units and the logistical and force 
protection challenges resulting from sustaining the ECO unit.  The ECO 
communication solution would bridge this gap enabling numerous additive 
capabilities.  Casualty evacuation and re-supply, similar information flow 
processes, are two of the greatest hurdles to ECO.  The authors developed a 
case study to determine the additive capability and return on investment when 
comparing the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) processes between a traditional 
single-channel RF network and a fully networked, mesh network that would be 
required for an ECO communication solution.  The case study modeled the 
process after OIF CASEVAC procedures as experienced by one of the authors.   
The process was modeled using Savvion Process Modeler software to 
simulate 2,880 CASEVAC missions using both process models: the traditional 
RF network, and the enhanced ECO communication solution.   
This case study examined a conventional tactical Marine combat unit 
deployed in theater, outside of the current ECO conceptual construct, tasked with 
getting a casualty out of a combat area to receive appropriate medical attention.  
This case study assessed the process flow challenges in getting a casualty from 
the front line of troops back to the appropriate medical facility in the most 
expeditious manner during the critical golden hour.90 
The process begins with a casualty in need of medical support.  The 
organic Navy corpsman with the unit assesses the casualty and determines the 
level of combat health support needed: level one (Routine), level two (Priority), or 
level three (Immediate).  The action required determines the process flow.  The 
process model used two information flow objectives: first, identify the casualty; 
and, second, transmit this information to higher headquarters for dedication of 
 
90 The most critical period of time for anyone who is seriously injured is the “golden hour”—
the interval between the occurrence of the injury and the administration of appropriate aid. 
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appropriate assets for extraction.  The processes modeled used identical 
procedures with different information flow processes.  The single greatest limiting 
element to the single-channel voice communication model was the 
communication latency that lacked a data capability and was not networked to all 
appropriate stakeholders.  Further, the hierarchical construct of the stakeholders 
resulted in an inefficient information flow.  The value of the ECO communication 
network was that it streamlined the information flow process with a Layer-3 
wireless data network solution utilizing database services to retrieve casualty 
information and pass data, e.g., medical record, health history, PLI, etc., to key 
stakeholders, concurrently.  Standardized tactical applications enhanced the 
information push/pull focusing on the valued information, i.e., minimal elements 
from the entire file record in its information stream.  All tactical coordination was 
coordinated through the network in which position location information data is 
shared across nodes in lieu of reporting via voice, eliminating garble, cross-talk 
and retransmission. 
The results of the Savvion process modeling software calculated a 27% 
efficiency gain in information flow in the ECO communication model.  The ECO 
model resulted in significantly more efficient information flows.  The efficient 
gains were most notable with the instantaneous access to information for all 
stakeholders, providing real-time updates throughout the process. 
VII. EVALUATION OF CURRENT AND EMERGING DOD 
TACTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
A. EVALUATION OF NETWORK DEVICES CURRENTLY IN USE 
The following information system technologies are currently used by 
Marine Corps operating forces in tactical units identified for ECO and CAPSET V 
user capabilities.  Capability gaps identified by the Command and Control 
Integration Division of MCCDC91 are listed along with those capability gaps as 




Capability Gaps Identified in the COC Study CAPSET V for MAGTF C2 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Capable 
 Data Capable Capable 
 Data Rate Med 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable (VHF & UHF Mode) Gap 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable (DAMA SATCOM Mode) Capable 
 Dismountable Capable 
 On-The-Move Capable Capable 
Table 1.   AN/PRC-117G Evaluation-Capability Gaps 
                                            
91 (C2ID), Command and Control Integration Division, Combat Operations Center (COC) 
Study Capability Set (CAPSET) V for Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command 
and Control (C2). Doctrinal Study, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 
United States Marine Corps, Woodbridge: Computer Sciences Corporation, 2008, ES-1. 
92 Harris Corporation, "Advanced Networking Wideband Waveform (ANW2): Overview for the 




Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Gap 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Capable 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Capable 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Gap 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Capable 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its 
connections. 
Capable 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for 
dedicated router devices. 
Gap 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection with a secure MAC. Capable 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Capable 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Capable 
Table 2.   AN/PRC-117G Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
 
                                            
93 Harris Corporation, "Advanced Networking Wideband Waveform (ANW2): Overview for the 
AN/PRC-117G." Harris, October 2008. 
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Integrated Intra-Squad Radio (IISR)94  
Capability Gaps Identified in the COC Study CAPSET V for MAGTF C2 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Capable 
 Data Capable Gap 
 Data Rate Low 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Gap 
 Dismountable Capable 
 On-The-Move Capable Capable 
Table 3.   IISR Evaluation-Capability Gaps 
                                            
94 Integrated Intra-Squad Radio, PG-12 Communications, Intelligence, & Networking 
Systems. "PG-12 Tactical Communications." Marine Corps Systems Command. 
http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/cins/CNS/Tactical%20Radios/IISR.html (Accessed July 
2009). 
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Integrated Intra-Squad Radio (IISR)95  
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Gap 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Gap 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Gap 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Gap 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Gap 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its connections. Gap 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for dedicated router 
devices. 
Gap 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Gap 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Gap 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Capable 
Table 4.   IISR Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
                                            
95 Integrated Intra-Squad Radio, PG-12 Communications, Intelligence, & Networking 
Systems. "PG-12 Tactical Communications." Marine Corps Systems Command. 
http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/cins/CNS/Tactical%20Radios/IISR.html (Accessed July 
2009). 
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 AN/PSC-596  
Capability Gaps Identified in the COC Study CAPSET V for MAGTF C2 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Capable 
 Data Capable Capable 
 Data Rate Med-Low 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Capable 
 Dismountable Capable 
 On-The-Move Capable Capable 
Table 5.   AN/PSC-5 Evaluation-Capability Gaps 
                                            
96 Raytheon, "AN/PSC-5 White Paper." Raytheon. 
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/rtnwcm/groups/ncs/documents/content/rtn_ncs_products_ps
c5c_pdf.pdf (Accessed August 2009). 
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 AN/PSC-597  
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Gap 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Gap 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Gap 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Gap 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Gap 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its connections. Gap 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for 
additional dedicated router devices. Gap 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Capable 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Capable 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Capable 
Table 6.   AN/PSC-5 Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
 
                                            
97 Raytheon. "AN/PSC-5 White Paper." Raytheon. 
http://www.rayth,on.com/capabilities/rtnwcm/groups/ncs/documents/content/rtn_ncs_products_ps
c5c_pdf.pdf (Accessed August 2009). 
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AN/PRC-150C98  
Capability Gaps Identified in the COC Study CAPSET V for MAGTF C2 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Capable 
 Data Capable Capable 
 Data Rate Very Low 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Capable 
 Dismountable Capable 
 On-The-Move Capable Capable 
Table 7.   AN/PRC-150 Evaluation-Capability Gaps 
                                            
98 (C2ID), Command and Control Integration Division. Combat Operations Center (COC) 
Study Capability Set (CAPSET) V for Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command 
and Control (C2). Doctrinal Study, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 
United States Marine Corps, Woodbridge: Computer Sciences Corporation, 2008, 15. 
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 AN/PRC-150C99  
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Gap 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Gap 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Gap 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Gap 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Gap 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its connections. Gap 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for 
dedicated router devices. Gap 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Gap 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Gap 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Gap 
Table 8.   AN/PRC-150C-Requirements Gaps 
                                            
99 (C2ID), Command and Control Integration Division. Combat Operations Center (COC) 
Study Capability Set (CAPSET) V for Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command 
and Control (C2). Doctrinal Study, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 
United States Marine Corps, Woodbridge: Computer Sciences Corporation, 2008, 15. 
 74
 Enhanced Position Location Reporting 
System (EPLRS)100  
Capability Gaps Identified in the COC Study CAPSET V for MAGTF C2 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Gap 
 Data Capable Capable 
 Data Rate Medium 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Gap 
 Dismountable Gap 
 On-The-Move Capable Capable 
Table 9.   EPLRS Evaluation-Capability Gaps 
                                            
100 (C2ID), Command and Control Integration Division. Combat Operations Center (COC) 
Study Capabilit, Set (CAPSET) V for Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command 
and Control (C2). Doctrinal Study, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 
United States Marine Corps, Woodbridge: Computer Sciences Corporation, 2008, 15. 
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 Enhanced Position Location Reporting 
System (EPLRS)101  
 
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Capable 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Gap 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Capable 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Capable 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Gap 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Capable 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its connections. Gap 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for 
dedicated router devices. 
Capable 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Capable 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Capable 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Capable 
Table 10.   EPLRS Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
 
 
                                            
101 (C2ID), Command and Control Integration Division. Combat Operations Center (COC) 
Study Capability Set (CAPSET) V for Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command 
and Control (C2). Doctrinal Study, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 
United States Marine Corps, Woodbridge: Computer Sciences Corporation, 2008, 15. 
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Command and Control On-the-Move 
Network, Digital Over-the-Horizon Relay 
(CONDOR)102  
Capability Gaps Identified in the COC Study CAPSET V for MAGTF C2 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Gap 
 Data Capable Capable 
 Data Rate Low 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Capable 
 Dismountable Gap 
 On-The-Move Capable Capable 
Table 11.   CONDOR Evaluation-Capability Gaps 
                                            
102  PG-12 Communications, Intelligence, & Networking Systems, "PG-12 Tactical 
Communications." Marine Corps Systems Command. 
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/cins/CNS/ 
(Accessed July 2009). 
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Command and Control On-the-Move 
Network, Digital Over-the-Horizon Relay 
(CONDOR)103  
 
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. 
Capa
ble 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Gap 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Gap 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Gap 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Gap 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its connections. Gap 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Capa
ble 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for additional 
dedicated router devices. 
Capa
ble 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Capa
ble 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Capa
ble 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Gap 
Table 12.   CONDOR Evaluation-Capability Gaps 
                                            
103  PG-12 Communications, Intelligence, & Networking Systems, "PG-12 Tactical 
Communications." Marine Corps Systems Command. 
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/cins/CNS/ 
(Accessed July 2009). 
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B. EVALUATION OF EMERGING NETWORK SYSTEMS 
Warfighter Information Network-Expeditionary (Win-X)104 
Increment 2 is targeted to provide a tactical network Point of 
Presence for company and below units. 
 
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Gap 
 Data Capable Capa
ble 
 Device employs wideband channels to achieve >500Kbps per node. Capa
ble 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Capa
ble 
 Dismountable Gap 
 On-The-Move Capable (Increment 2) Capa
ble 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Capa
ble 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Capa
ble 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Capa
ble 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Capa
ble 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Capa
ble 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing connections. Gap 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Capa
ble 
                                            
104 C4, USMC, Warfighter Information Network-Expeditionary WIN-X. Headquarters Marine 
Corps Brief, Quantico: USMC C4, 2008. 
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 80
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for additional dedicated 
router devices. 
Gap 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Capa
ble 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Capa
ble 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Capa
ble 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Gap 
Table 13.   WIN-X Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
 TW-220105  
Capability Gaps Identified in the COC Study CAPSET V for MAGTF C2 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Capable 
 Data Capable Capable 
 Device employs wideband channels to achieve >500Kbps per node. Gap 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Gap 
 Dismountable Capable 
 On-The-Move Capable Capable 
Table 14.   TW-220 Evaluation-Capability Gaps 
                                            
105 Capt Bob Price, Distributed Operations Tactical Command & Control (DOTC2) 
Experiment. Tactical Network Topology 08-2 Experiment After Action Report, Monterey: Naval 




Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Gap 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Gap 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Capable 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Capable 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Capable 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its 
connections. 
Capable 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for 
additional dedicated router devices. 
Capable 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Capable 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Capable 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Capable 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Capable 
Table 15.   TW-220 Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
 
                                            
106 Capt Bob Price, Distributed Operations Tactical Command & Control (DOTC2) 
Experiment. Tactical Network Topology 08-2 Experiment After Action Report, Monterey: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008. 
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Distributed Tactical Communications System (DTCS)107  
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Capable 
 Data Capable Gap 
 Device employs wideband channels to achieve >500Kbps per node. Gap 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Capable 
 Dismountable Capable 
 On-The-Move Capable (Increment 2) Capable 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Gap 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Gap 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Gap 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Gap 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing connections. Gap 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Gap 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for additional 
dedicated router devices. 
Capable 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Capable 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Gap 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Gap 
Table 16.   DTCS Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
                                            
107 USMC MCWL, CENTCOM, STRATCOM, NSWC Dahlgren, Distributed Tactical 
Communications System. Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) FY09 Candidate, 
HQMC, APW, 2007. 
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Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), Handheld, 
Manpack, Small Form Fit (HMS), Soldier Radio 
Waveform (SRW) 108  
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Capable 
 Data Capable Capable 
 Device employs wideband channels to achieve >500Kbps per node. Gap 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Capable 
 Dismountable Capable 
 On-The-Move Capable (Increment 2) Capable 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Gap 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Capable 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Gap 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Capable 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Capable 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Capable 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its connections. Gap 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for additional 
dedicated router devices. 
Gap 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Capable 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Capable 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Capable 
Table 17.   JTRS Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
                                            
108 JTRS, JPEO, "Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Joint Executive Program Office 
(JPEO)." Fact Sheet. San Diego: JTRS JPEO, April 2008. 
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 Enhanced Position Location Reporting System-
Extended Frequency (EPLRS-XF)109  
Requirement Gaps Evaluated Against Chapter V Requirements 
 Voice Capable (Analog or Digital) Gap 
 Data Capable Capable 
 Device employs wideband channels to achieve >500Kbps per node. Capable 
 Beyond Line of Sight Capable Gap 
 Dismountable Gap 
 On-The-Move Capable Gap 
 Every node in a tactical mesh network must be a router. Capable 
 Extend the Convergence Layer to each node (individual Marine). Gap 
 Converge all information to Layer 3 (eliminate separate voice). Capable 
 Each node can be connected directly to each of the others within range. Capable 
 Each node is willing to forward data for other nodes. Capable 
 Each node is capable of handling many-to-many connections. Capable 
 Each node is capable of dynamically updating and optimizing its connections. Capable 
 The network must use a connectionless stateless design (Layer-3). Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be software defined. Capable 
 Each node’s transmission system must be logically separate from its router. Gap 
 The network must be scalable to large nodal capacities without the need for additional 
dedicated router devices. 
Capable 
 Each node provides infrastructure protection. Capable 
 Each node must be provisioned with an SNMP agent. Gap 
 Each node must have a stable MAC. Capable 
 Each node must have the ability to multicast. Capable 
Table 18.   EPLRS-XF Evaluation-Requirements Gaps 
                                            
109 Raytheon, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System-Extended Frequency. White 
Paper, Fullerton, CA: Raytheon Company, 2009. 
 85
 86




Applying the information systems model described in Chapter II, to the 
evaluation of current and emerging network technologies can provide a 
discriminating and useful perspective on the determination of the overall value for 
which a system provides.  The majority of the current systems are obviously 
intended primarily for voice communication.  This makes sense in that operations 
at the lower tactical levels have traditionally been conducted via voice 
communications; and should be in the future.  However, if we are honestly 
attempting to move towards a truly NCW doctrine, then it is incumbent upon 
those of us in the DoD’s information technology arena to re-examine the design 
and doctrine that enables operations at this lower tactical level.  This is 
particularly true in the concept of ECO. 
A small percentage of the systems evaluated in Chapter VII achieve some 
degree of network switching/routing capability, but the majority of the systems 
simply do not possess a true Layer-3 capability.  According to the BIRM, this 
prevents a system from being interoperable at the first layer, and therefore 
should be the first level of evaluation when comparing information systems to the 
characteristics of the BIRM.  From the outset, this prevents multiple networks, 
which may possess an operational imperative, from becoming an internetwork.  
The de facto value of “n,” or combat power, among these systems is lower as a 
result of their non-interoperability. 
The same devaluation of “n” is true for those systems that are not mesh 
capable.  That is, they do not have the capability to directly connect to each 
other.  Or, they do not dynamically update and optimize those connections.  
These systems are characteristic of legacy networks that only achieve the value 
of “n” in a linear fashion, similar to a broadcast-only network. 
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None of the current and emerging systems are converging voice and data, 
and are therefore wasting precious bandwidth in a wireless system.  Granted, 
these systems must be able to communicate with legacy systems, but the 
transition must take place at some point.  This transition is possible now with the 
use of gateways.  This is done by isolating legacy voice systems behind a 
gateway which uses a software application to convert digital voice to VoIP.110  It 
is clearly evident that, by dividing up channel spaces between IP-based data and 
digital voice, bandwidth is not being optimized.  Additionally, the network devices 
are forced to deal with these two disparate media.  So instead of carrying around 
a dedicated network device that is efficiently processing a single form of 
information, the Marine must carry around the functionality of several different 
devices crammed into one unit.  Given limited space, power, and weight of any 
device, would it not be more efficient and capable if the device were focused on a 
single format of data? 
Those systems that are not truly extending the GIG to the individual 
Marine are only creating more network complexity by generating the requirement 
for an additional gateway to reach the Convergence Layer.  The ultimate goal, for 
which the above observations support, is to extend the Convergence Layer of the 
GIG to the individual Marine.  Only then will we achieve NCW at the lowest 
tactical level, thus generating increased combat power and the exponential 
advantages of ECO. 
B. OPTIMAL COMMUNICATION SOLUTION 
The optimal communication solution for enabling ECO is one that is 
designed to ensure interoperability.  Current and emerging information systems 




110 Clayton A. Craig and Christopher S. Tsirlis, "Command & Control for Distributed 
Operations: An Analysis of Possible Technologies, Structure & Employment." Thesis. Naval 
Postgraduate School, June 2007. 
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value achieved by a truly interoperable tactical mesh network.  These systems do 
not provide a scalable architecture that will exploit the concept of network-centric 
warfare. 
None of the radios/network devices surveyed in Chapter VII meet the 
critical requirements of modularity, which allows us to achieve interoperability.  
Modularity allows us to achieve three primary advantageous: interoperability, 
maintainability, and “futureproofing.”  “Futureproofing” being the characteristic 
that allows us to set our tactical networks up for unknown future requirements.  
Much like the common networking standards we use today, such as Ethernet and 
Internet Protocol, have ensured the modularization and profligate evolution of the 
internet, a modularized tactical network architecture will enable the interchanging 
and adaptation of better and better transmission systems and endpoint devices. 
ECO and those CAPSET V users share the same fundamental 
requirement: the extension of the GIG to the individual Marine.  Based on the 
capability requirements identified in the MCWL’s ECO Concept, and those 
identified in MCCDC’s CAPSET V study, it is determined that, while the 
operational doctrine may be slightly different, both concepts require the same 
overall information system requirements.  The network, and the endpoint devices 
that process data on the network, must be encapsulated in an overall 
architectural design that not only supports interoperability but establishes a 
foundation for future innovation and development in both the component’s design 
and use of the information system. 
By laying the foundation for interoperability, we are ensuring that small 
tactical mesh networks can be internetworked among themselves and with 
subordinate, adjacent, and higher units seamlessly.  In essence, we are ensuring 
that all Marine units can exploit the known and unknown advantages of an NCW 
capability.  In doing so, we will be in a position to leverage the concept of ECO in 
the conduct of future Marine Corps combat operations. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Any future decisions on information systems requirements in the Marine 
Corps must focus on the architecture.  Instead of focusing on specific functional 
requirements aligned with operational C2 capabilities, future analyses must focus 
on modular design.  It is imperative that current and future network 
communication systems be evaluated based on their modularity and thus their 
capacity for interoperability.  While this thesis focuses on communication 
solutions for smaller tactical units, the requirements identified here can apply to 
communication solutions in all capability sets. 
The acquisition of future network communication solutions must adhere to 
the concepts of Layer-3 capability and the extension of the GIG’s convergence 
layer to the individual Marine.  By decoupling endpoint device functionality from 
the communications network, a degree of modularity will enable an infinite 
degree of usability and interchange.  Future acquisitions of wireless 
communication systems should ensure scalability with the demand of a stable 
MAC.  They should ensure efficient use of the very limited resource of wireless 
bandwidth with multicasting and fault control/monitoring capabilities.  Infinite 
possibilities exist for tactical network users, as they will not just be tied into the 
GIG, but they will already be on the GIG’s convergence layer, and their reach will 
be global. 
Modularity must also be considered in the acquisition of endpoint devices.  
By following the “Good Network Citizens” criteria, future endpoint devices can be 
purchased in a rapid acquisition cycle and maintain the capability to be 
interchanged and reused with multiple communication solutions.  For example, 
the image and video capturing sniper scope, or target designation device will 
have the same network capabilities whether used with a small unit conducting 
ECO or employed on a UAV, because they would have the necessary network 
components to ensure interoperability. 
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